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The Force Publique’s Campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, 1892-1894 
Abstract 
Between 1892 and 1894 the Force Publique of King Leopold II’s Congo Free State engaged in a series 
of little-known counter-insurgency operations against ivory and slave traders from Zanzibar, 
commonly referred to as Arabs. Without a particularly strong tradition of imperial service, this article 
argues that the predominantly Belgian officer corps borrowed and adapted methods used by more 
experienced colonial forces in the 19th Century. Whether taken from existing literature or learned 
through experience, it reveals that the Force Publique’s counter-insurgency methods reflected many 
of the more recognisable aspects of traditional French and British approaches. It suggests that, despite 
the unique nature of each colonial campaign, basic principles could be adapted by whomsoever to 
overcome the military and political challenges of colonial conquest. The Force Publique’s campaigns 




 When the Société d’Études Coloniales de Bruxelles published L’art militaire au Congo under 
the direction of Colonel Donny of the Belgian Army in 1897, few could blame late-nineteenth century 
students of colonial warfare for barely taking note.1 Its largely forgotten pages offered little in the way 
of revolutionary approaches to the conduct of small wars. Instead, it focused on the tactical and 
operational narrative of a small, locally-raised force under the stewardship of a handful of white 
officers bent on denying the Swahili-speaking Muslim warlords, commonly referred to as Arabs by 
contemporary Europeans, access to Congolese ivory and slaves. Compared to its contemporaneous 
publications such as Charles E. Callwell’s 1896 book, Small Wars: their principles and practice, or 
Hubert Lyautey’s 1900 article, ‘Du  rôle colonial de l’armée’, Donny’s exaltation of methods used in 
the Congo Free State (CFS) paled into insignificance. After all, what lessons could a solitary campaign 
for economic supremacy, conducted by an inexperienced force, in a largely unknown area of Africa, 
offer readers that were not already being extrapolated from the myriad campaigns fought by the 
armies of more established Empires?2 Yet, L’art militaire au Congo was not a useless piece of self-
indulgence. It offered, and continues to offer, a window into the approach taken by the predominantly 
Belgian-officered Force Publique to overcome the specific challenges posed by the Congo-Arab War of 
1892-1894. Whether taken from existing literature or learned through experience, it reveals that the 
Force Publique’s counter-insurgency methods reflected many of the more recognisable aspects of 
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traditional French and British approaches. It suggests that, despite the unique nature of each colonial 
campaign, basic principles could be adapted by whomsoever to overcome the military and political 
challenges of colonial conquest. The Force Publique’s campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, therefore, 
provide further evidence as to how some base theories could be universally applied. 
 Recent scholarship on modern counter-insurgency has tended to contextualise itself within 
the historical precedents of the nineteenth century.3 However, the suggestion that an uninterrupted 
lineage of doctrinal development can be traced from the late eighteenth century is inherently 
problematic. Irregular warfare is anything but formulaic. The diversity of colonial operations did not 
permit for a set of tactical principles to be distilled for consistent application in all scenarios as was 
the fashion for conventional warfare in Europe.4 As Douglas Porch notes, ‘Callwell can hardly claim to 
be the Clausewitz of colonial warfare, but that is precisely the point. From its earliest days, small wars 
were embraced as a refutation of modern, intellectual, more strategically sophisticated analytical and 
technological approaches to warfare.’5 Instead, flexibility in the formulation of attainable objectives, 
both militarily and politically, came to determine the degree of European success in the colonies. If 
this meant ‘going native’ and assimilating oneself in the cultural and military practices of one’s enemy, 
as the French were more wont to do than the British at times, then so be it.6 These were the kinds of 
transferable principles that might be adapted to accommodate the vagaries of different colonial 
campaigns. Certainly, this is where it is possible to trace a degree of universality between the Congo-
Arab War and the better-documented French and British experiences. For, as Belgium’s pre-eminent 
scholar on the subject has noted, the Force Publique’s success under the command of Francis Dhanis, 
owed as much to his subordination of military operations to political objectives as it did to his 
willingness to disregard conventional tactical practices.7 
Like so many colonial officers before him, and many to come thereafter, Dhanis’ approach to 
colonial campaigning was improvised. It relied on personal qualities of energy, imagination, and skill 
in both military and political spheres. The Arab campaign was less a pure act of war than a means of 
taking possession and organising territories, which required officers to transcend the somewhat 
limited framework of conventional military training received at the École Militaire.8 This was no 
different to elsewhere. Colonial warfare was anathema to most European armies, whose institutional 
conservatism and obsession with ‘real war’ precluded the former from being taught at military 
academies. Despite Callwell’s attempts from the mid-1880s to synthesise colonial experiences beyond 
the British case in a bid to contribute to an international scholarly debate, the most common means 
of information transmission was through informal channels; soldier-to-soldier interactions, private 
study, and personal experience.9  This, it has been argued, established the basis for ‘national 
traditions’ to develop in counter-insurgency methods. 10  
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Thus, the French, from Louis-Gabriel Suchet and Thomas-Robert Bugeaud in the first half of 
the nineteenth century, through to Joseph-Simon Galliéni and his protégé, Lyautey, at its conclusion, 
slowly developed a population-centric approach to assimilate political and military objectives that 
would come to form the recognisable concept of the tache d’huile, or oil stain.11 Meanwhile, British 
concern with costs, manpower, and enemy morale quite often led to a preference for seizing the 
initiative, which, as the twentieth century dawned, frequently manifested itself in ‘butcher and bolt’ 
operations.12 Although Belgium did not have a strong imperial tradition to draw upon itself, the 
experiences of its officers attached to the French in Algeria in the 1840s and Mexico in the 1860s, 
provided a point of reference for aspiring colonial officers.13 Be it recognising the importance of 
conciliatory policies in the aftermath of Bugeaud’s brutal razzias, or the emphasis placed on mobility 
and tactical flexibility of his, and later Bazaine’s, mobile columns in fighting an elusive enemy, clear 
transferable principles of counter-insurgency operations were in circulation for prospective Force 
Publique officers to digest.14   
Whether adapted from the nascent pan-European discourse, personal reflection on historical 
precedents, or an organic arrival at similar conclusions, the Force Publique applied a combination of 
methods in its struggle to pacify and control the Congo region. The primacy of political objectives, the 
importance of population-centric approaches, the emphasis on morale, and the adoption of local 
fighting methods suggest a degree of uniformity in the approach to colonial warfare. Therefore, even 
if the officers during the Congo-Arab War did not act from a position of prior knowledge, there is a 
strong indication that these commonalities in nineteenth century counter-insurgency methods 
emerged organically across different armies at around the same time. Without being limited to a 
‘British way’ or a ‘French way’, there is good reason to believe that an adaptive synergy of core 
principles was developed by like-minded officers when faced with the unique challenges posed by 
colonial campaigning. In this sense, the experiences of Dhanis, documented – but, subsequently 
forgotten - in Donny’s work, are as important in understanding the essence of nineteenth century 
counter-insurgency as those of more famous colonial soldiers and campaigns. 
Circumstance clearly played a significant role in determining the CFS’s approach in the 
pacification of the Congo. For this was no ordinary colonial war of conquest in which the invading army 
sought to force a resistant local population into submission. There was some of that, to be sure, but 
the primary enemies were themselves interlopers into the host territory. The Arabs had begun to 
penetrate into the eastern part of the Congo from Zanzibar in search of ivory and slaves in the mid-
nineteenth century. Amidst the internecine struggles of the Congo region, which were aggravated by 
the influx of firearms, these Arab warlords drew strength from continuous expansion. With greater 
access to animal, human, and the monetary rewards to be harvested therein, came greater desire to 
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push for more.15 This was not a new phenomenon. Richard Reid has notably demonstrated that many 
sub-Saharan socio-political systems had competed in arms races from as early as the seventeenth 
century in order to establish themselves over their adversaries.16 By the nineteenth century, there was 
veritable African military revolution taking place with endemic violence at the hands of increasingly 
well-armed militaristic societies at its heart.17 Broader trends towards the militarisation of politics in 
eastern and central Africa were, consequently, well established before CFS forces became embroiled 
in the struggle for economic monopolisation from the 1880s.18 As such, the embryonic Force Publique 
faced quite a task to pacify and expand its own economic reach against a well-armed, well-financed, 
and shrewd opponent. 
 From the outset, King Leopold II’s imperial venture into the uncharted territory spanning 
central Africa equally elicited the use of brute force against the autochthone populations of the region. 
Henry Morton Stanley’s numerous expeditions, during which he established trading posts and 
defensible bases along the Congo River and its tributaries, were frequently bloody affairs. Later, with 
the creation of the Force Publique in 1885, violence in the economic exploitation of the Congo region 
became systematised and endemic – albeit well-hidden behind a humanitarian veneer.19 A report by 
the Interim General Administrator of the Department of the Interior to King Leopold II exemplified 
this, when it stated that the repression of the slave trade had always been at the heart of the 
enterprise. It was the Arab ‘razzias’ – an interesting use of the term - which compelled Commanders 
to extend their influence so as to offer local populations protection against these slave runs.20 
However, it was soon evident that white officers were using this liberty to directly compete with the 
Arab warlords for economic hegemony.21 Far from shielding indigenous peoples from the cruelties of 
foreign invaders, the CFS’ own intervention exacerbated the use of violence in the region. The likes of 
Clément Brasseur’s ‘reign of terror’, for example, earned him the local nickname of ‘’Nkulukulu’ after 
a bird ‘whose inner wings are bloody red”.22 Over time, through the introduction of the système 
domanial, the brutalisation of the Congo became aligned with a system of values that prioritised profit 
over all else. As Guy Vanthemsche has suggested, the CFS could not rely on the metropolis to meet 
the military and administrative costs of Empire, resulting in ‘a particularly severe and exploitative 
regime’.23  
Nevertheless, CFS agents and officers spent much of their time following up hard pacification 
with something more akin to hearts and minds. Before, during, and after the Congo-Arab War, great 
lengths were taken to keep certain indigenous chiefs on side. Good relations not only provided the 
CFS with greater ease of movement through the vast territory, but also afforded it access to auxiliary 
forces. By simple means of establishing bases for trading and agricultural purposes, expelling the Arab 
slave raiders, and supplying weapons and gunpowder to support weaker kingdoms in settling old 
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scores, CFS officers and officials were able to mask some of their own brutality.24 In Dhanis’ case, his 
description as ‘a charming man, if a little strange at times, an old African, but of a rare intelligence, 
speaking all the languages of the country like they were his own,’ served him immeasurably well during 
the campaign.25 Even before serious hostilities commenced, he managed to subdue the entire Kwango 
province by means of ‘diplomacy’, supported by just 80 soldiers and 150 porters.26 The results 
separated the local population from the enemy by creating a base of natural support, which then 
provided keen and willing sources of intelligence to facilitate future military operations. 
In this regard, similarities can be drawn with both British and French experiences. Divide and 
rule was not a new idea, as the establishment of Britain’s Indian Army and the general appropriation 
of social hierarchies broadly testified.27 However, the manner in which the French began to apply this 
in Algeria during the 1840s demonstrated first-hand to Belgian observers the importance of marrying 
long-term political objectives to a military campaign. As Porch has noted: 
Whatever the military arguments in favour of the razzia, its long-term effects were baleful. 
Discipline was difficult to maintain when soldiers were allowed to burn, pillage, and rape. 
Soon attitudes hardened, sensibilities were anesthetized and any political or military goals 
beyond utter devastation were lost in an orgy of brutality and excess.28  
Indigenous populations who were unwilling to ‘accept the yoke of conquest’ after witnessing the 
devastation wrought by a flying column could expect ‘a war of extermination’.29 However, for 
those willing to submit, Bugeaud was prepared to accompany his military successes with a durable 
political plan to pacify the region. His ideas of Franco-Arab assimilation led to reconciliation 
between conqueror and conquered by selecting the most influential and willing tribal leaders to 
govern under the supervision of French officials in the newly created bureaux arabes.30 This did 
not put an end to the use of maximum force by any means, but the ultimate aim of French 
imperialism to culturally integrate indigenous peoples demonstrated a willingness to move past 
the purely military facets of conquest.31 This was later refined and adapted by the likes of 
Faidherbe and Galliéni - to relatively good effect - before culminating in Lyautey’s policy of 
‘peaceful penetration’.32 
Although CFS officers instinctively erred towards the offensive, dealings with the Arab 
warlords often required them to heed Callwell’s’ words that a ‘delay in entering upon hostilities will 
but slightly prejudice the chance of ultimate success, [but] any hesitation when operations have 
commenced is to be deprecated’.33 In the absence of sufficient infrastructure to adequately take the 
war to the Arab slavers, it was recommended to pursue an intermediary policy of appeasement while 
CFS strength was built up. To this end, conciliatory methods, such as the nomination of Hamad bin 
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Muhammad bin Juma bin Rajab el Murjebi, otherwise known as Tippu-Tip, to the Governorship at 
Stanley Falls on 24 February 1887 were taken. This, temporarily at least, curbed the frequency of the 
razzias by encouraging the Arabs to sell their ivory to the CFS instead of using large slave caravans to 
transport their goods to Zanzibar.34 However, it did not put an end to human trafficking. Force Publique 
officers routinely employed Arab slave-traders as recruiting agents, whose sole access to physically-
able young men was through slave raids.35 Sefu, one of Tippu-Tip’s sons, was one such agent paid 10 
francs per month with an additional bonus of 100 francs for each able recruit furnished.36 In this way, 
as in others, the CFS actually encouraged the continuation of the slave trade they purported to be 
fighting against.  
 Notwithstanding, relations between the CFS and the Arab warlords remained on a knife-edge. 
With both parties evidently competing for influence and access to untapped riches, there was good 
reason to believe that something was likely to give.37 Enforcing the structures of the State on the Arabs 
and reminding them of their duty to uphold law and order within their jurisdictions was a delicate 
matter in itself.38 The flagrant strengthening of the Force Publique, the fortification of outposts, and 
the expansion of infrastructure only exacerbated existing issues. Still, the instructions issued by the 
Governor General, Camille Jannsen, to Lieutenant Nicolas Isidore Tobback on 30 April 1890, revealed 
that the Arabs were not believed to have offensive intentions in the near future.39 As such, CFS officials 
continued to promote caution in their dealings, for it would be ‘unpardonable to [attack] without 
having every chance of winning’.40 It was simply unthinkable, given the state of the Congo’s existing 
communications, the as yet incomplete recruitment of the Force Publique, and the lack of control over 
certain strategic points, to engage and be beaten in a protracted war.41 This was not to say that further 
preparations could not be made. For instance, Jannsen advocated fortifying the key defensive 
positions under CFS control, whilst simultaneously seeking opportunities to secure others in order to 
demonstrate to the Great Powers ‘our rights to our conquests through our ability to defend them’.42 
As long as sufficient explanations and assurances were given to the Arabs to justify any action taken; 
for instance, declaring that those attacked were taken to be irregulars operating against the express 
wishes of the legitimate chief with whom the CFS wished to remain on good terms, the Governor 
General felt certain trouble could be avoided.43 
 Local engagements between the CFS and Arab forces in 1890 and 1891 were not unheard of. 
In fact, they were to play a significant role in the deterioration in CFS-Arab relations by 1892. The 
defeat of the former slave, turned vassal of Tippu-Tip, Ngongo Luteta on the Lomami; engagements 
at Ibembo and Majorapa; and Captain Guillaume Van Kerkhoven’s expedition in the upper-Ouellé, 
highlight the frequency with which the two competing empires came to blows.44 These actions, which 
often resulted in significant bloodshed were made worse by the unsolicited requisition of ivory from 
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Arab possession. Although supposedly acting within the agreed territorial limits of CFS/Arab influence, 
the combination of military operations, venturesome commercial activities, and the introduction of a 
tax on ivory, gave cause for rival Arab warlords in Maniema to set aside their differences. Financially 
threatened, Mounié Moharra, Sefu’s uncle and one-time opponent of Tippu-Tip, declared that ‘the 
white man was too evil to live with’.45 Rejecting the authority of King Leopold II, the Arab chiefs united 
in open rebellion.46 When, in May 1892, the commercial expedition led by the British ivory trader, 
Arthur Hodister, was massacred at Riba-Riba by order of Sefu, the bleak prospect of a full-scale 
insurgency became apparent.  
 The opposing forces differed in numbers, quality, and equipment. It has been estimated that 
just over 10,000 men were utilised by the CFS during the campaign. Opposing them, the Arab warlords 
had access to some 100,000 men, although their inability to concentrate their manpower squandered 
a key advantage.47 This disparity was  further compensated for in training, weapons, and command. 
Although the embryonic Force Publique was not, as yet, at the height of its preparedness, the 
establishment of a military base at Boma in 1886 had already turned out over 2,000 trained regulars 
by the end of 1888.48 By 1891, the Force Publique numbered 3,186.49 These locally-raised troops, 
recruited on a seven year engagement, gradually began to replace the more expensive, short-service 
coastal volunteers (predominantly, but not exclusively, Haoussas and Zanzibaris) from neighbouring 
imperial possessions.50 Like the British and French before them, the CFS preferred to recruit across a 
number of ethnicities; though this created problems in itself. Separate quarters, the imposition of 
French as a language of command, as well as racial stereotyping shaped officers’ opinions of the 
regulars under their command. Tobback, for example, described Haoussas and Bangalas as deferential 
and compliant, but completely ‘ignorant of their profession as soldiers.’51 However, Lieutenant Emile 
Lémery’s recollection that, ‘In war, they [Haoussas] are real lions; they throw themselves at the enemy 
with a cry, feverishly savage, brandishing their gun in one hand and a terrible machete in the other, of 
which they make good use,’ suggests that indigenous troops could sometimes be forgiven for a lack 
of European professionalism.52 
 Nevertheless, armed with the latest Albini rifles, the Force Publique’s regular units consistently 
out-soldiered and out-gunned the enemy.53 Although possessing somewhere in the region of 30,000 
guns, many of which were percussion pieces, the Arab forces tended to operate independently of one 
another and lacked the organisation and fire-discipline to make their numeric advantage count.54 A 
clear indication of this can be found in, the then, Lieutenant Francis Dhanis’ early 1892 engagements 
against the former slave, turned warlord, Ngongo Luteta.55 Acting independently of the events 
brewing in Maniema, this vassal of Tippu-Tip had, once again, taken to the field in an attempt to cross 
the Sankuru River on a slave run. Although outnumbered, Dhanis was able to count on the superior 
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training and equipment of the Force Publique to redress the balance of forces. The steadfastness and 
firepower of Dhanis’ regular troops reaped its rewards as Nongo Luteta was defeated four times in 
three weeks: on 24 April at Mona-Kialo; on 5 and 9 May at Batubenge; and again on 12 May at Kisima-
Souri.56 Comprehending the shift in momentum, Ngongo Luteta submitted to Dhanis. His capital of 
N’Gandu was turned over to CFS control while he, and his entire retinue, offered their services to the 
Force Publique. Ever the pragmatist, Dhanis exhibited shrewd political acumen in accepting the offer, 
for, not only did it furnish him with thousands of auxiliary troops for the upcoming campaign he 
planned to wage in Katanga, but it also pacified the region between the Sankuru and Lomami Rivers. 
However, it should be noted that Ngongo Luteta was equally playing a shrewd political game in allying 
himself with the Europeans, having already submitted to Delcommune the previous year. Access to 
weapons, munitions, and information was as crucial to his personal ambitions as his manpower was 
to Dhanis.57 
 Auxiliaries were an important addition to the CFS’ order of battle. Despite their shaky 
performance at Batubenge on 9 May, during which approximately 500 of them had fled, sheer 
numbers, combined with local fighting techniques, offered Dhanis tactical and operational flexibility. 
In addition to Ngongo Luteta’s warriors, the CFS was able to call upon thousands of irregular soldiers 
at short notice from pacified regions.58 Placed under the command of promoted black NCOs, these 
more mobile units often acted independently from the main force, carrying out raids and razzias as 
they harassed the ephemeral enemy. In short, auxiliaries were used to carry out much of the ‘dirty 
work’ during the campaign.59 It echoed the practice adopted in many nineteenth century colonial 
campaigns and counter-insurgencies, in which it was ‘the disciplined army that [was] obliged to 
conform its methods to those of [its] adversaries’.60 Bugeaud’s light columns in Algeria were famously 
reorganised to become ‘even more Arab than the Arabs’, while mobile forces were raised or converted 
to gather intelligence and take the fight to irregulars in France’s Mexico campaign and countless British 
expeditions.61 Understanding the enemy’s characteristics and displaying flexibility in meeting them 
was the surest way of establishing achievable operational objectives to counter the strategic 
advantage the enemy regularly held. 
 Invariably, the objective was always to bring the enemy to battle in order to secure a swift 
end to otherwise costly campaigns. Dierk Walter even goes as far as to label it an ‘obsession’.62 This 
was imperative for, as pre-1914 German counter-insurgency showed, the absence of ‘identifiable 
strategic targets [could combine] with decentralised command and control to cause operational 
solutions to expand to fill a vacuum of civilian oversight and vague war aims’.63 For Donny this meant 
the destruction of the enemy’s men and resources through offensive military action – the complete 
removal of the Zanzibari Arabs from influence in the Congo region.64 However, as Callwell had 
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previously noted, ‘the disinclination shown by undisciplined warriors to commit themselves to a 
general engagement’ forced European officers to find alternative ways of bringing about a decisive 
solution.65 Vigorous operations to secure vital river crossings, capitals, as well as human and material 
resources were often required to bring an enemy to battle. Thus, General Sir Garnet Wolseley wrote 
that the objective should be ‘the capture of whatever they prize most, and the destruction or 
deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a conclusion.’66 It also explained why 
the French became so preoccupied with wars among the people, for as General Pierre le Compte de 
Castellane put it, 
In Europe, once [you are] master of two or three large cities, the entire country is yours. But 
in Africa, how do you act against a population whose only link with the land is the pegs of 
their tents? […] The only way is to take the grain which feeds them, the flocks which clothe 
them. For this reason, we make war on silos, war on cattle, [we make] the razzia.67 
In the case of the CFS’ campaign in the Congo, the targeting of ivory stocks served the dual purpose 
of crippling the Arabs’ fragile economy and forcing them into giving battle. It also had the subsidiary 
effect of enriching the State’s, and officers’ personal, coffers. 
 Dhanis’ actions were clearly inspired by a quest for glory and personal advancement. Seizing 
the initiative and winning a campaign that would deliver a pacified and organised territory, ripe for 
economic exploitation, would almost certainly be rewarded by a grateful Sovereign. As a Second 
Lieutenant in the 8th Line Infantry Regiment, who had passed out 16th in his cohort at the École 
Militaire, colonial aggrandisement equated to opportunity.68 After all, even Belgian officers who had 
achieved far less abroad in the past, be it in French service or that of the CFS, had obtained recognition 
for their efforts as the few men who returned to the Belgian army with any campaign experience.69 
This also proved to be the case for a number of Dhanis’ contemporaries, whose search for a release 
from the ‘trammels of European convention’ was only matched by the ambition to better otherwise 
stagnant military careers.70 To this end, valorous exploits in the name of ‘the nation’ or the ‘noble 
cause’ were frequently recorded with a home audience in mind.71  
 In a sense, this was not a new phenomenon. French and British colonial officers frequently 
acted hastily and beyond the bounds of respectability in order to establish a reputation back home. 
Often restrained by governmental policy or popular scrutiny, it was not uncommon to find ambitious 
men taking matters into their own hands in an attempt to fashion a fait accomplis. Whether it was 
Bugeaud’s effective, but inhumane, methods of the ‘razzia’, or Marchand’s epic, but desperately 
illogical, march across Africa to Fashoda, the pressure to obtain results that would be lauded and 
accepted by the métropole, was an influential factor in the conduct of war.72 That Sefu afforded Dhanis 
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with such an opportunity by redirecting his gaze from Katanga to the Maniema and beyond, was 
viewed as heaven-sent fortune. For with news of the Hodister massacre and the assassination of the 
Kasongo Residents, Lieutenant Josheph Lippens and Second Lieutenant Henri De Bruyne in November 
1892, came a pretext to wage an all-out war on the Arab slavers that cautious CFS administrators had 
heretofore sought to avoid. 
 The campaign that ensued required Dhanis to swiftly redirect his forces to Maniema. Spread 
out across a vast distance, initial operations were as much about pushing Sefu back beyond the 
Lomami as they were about concentrating men and resources.73 Battles and skirmishes were recorded 
on almost a daily occurrence in November and December 1892 as Dhanis, supported by Ngongo Luteta 
marched on Nyangwé and Kasongo. Defeating the forces of Mounié Moharra in early January 1893, 
during which the Arab warlord was killed, CFS troops arrived at the Lualaba River opposite Nyangwé 
by the end of the month. After an encounter battle that pushed the Arabs beyond the river, Dhanis 
entered an abandoned Nyangwé on 4 March. By 22 April, Kasongo had also fallen, forcing Sefu to 
retreat with the remainder of his forces to join with another Arab warlord, Rumaliza, 70 miles to the 
Southeast at Kabambare. Simultaneously, Captain Louis-Napoléon Chaltin was ordered by the State 
Inspector, Fivé, to leave his camp at Basoko in the North and join forces with Dhanis at Nyangwé. 
Steaming down river with 300 men, Chaltin arrived at a flaming Riba-Riba on 30 April 1893 and learned 
of the former Arab governor, Mserera’s, retreat to Stanley Falls.74 Pushing on, Chaltin reached Stanley 
Falls just in time to relive the besieged Tobback, whose relationship with Rashid, Tippu-Tip’s nephew 
and successor, had deteriorated markedly since the Hodister massacre. Together, the CFS forces 
pushed the Arabs out of the region from where they made for Kirundu and, subsequently, Kabambare. 
 These early engagements were characterised by Dhanis’ eagerness to organise and direct his 
disparate forces. Great energy was exerted in unifying forces ahead of engagements, but the distances 
involved and the fragility of communications meant that separation in the field, ‘ever […] a fruitful 
source of disaster’ according to Callwell, was a necessary evil.75 Relying on good intelligence networks, 
CFS forces could operate independently from one another and of their bases. Provided mobile 
columns could supply themselves on the move and were kept abreast of enemy movements, the Force 
Publique could seize the operational initiative with a degree of confidence. This allowed Michaux, with 
just a quarter of Dhanis’ regulars, to score a victory on the Lomami River in November 1892 while 
Dhanis, supported by Ngongo Luteta, dealt with the threat posed by Mounié-Pambé, Mounié 
Moharra’s son, on the Lualaba in December.76 Separate engagements in early January 1893 fought by 
detachments attempting to make contact with Dhanis’ main force, as well as Chaltin’s redirected 
campaign to relieve Stanley Falls in April, demonstrates the degree to which local initiative was 
allowed for when dealing with multiple threats.77 Mobility and reactiveness were key in this regard. 
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Although concerted efforts were made at various points to reorganise, regroup, and reinforce, the 
separation of forces was countenanced in order to retain the initiative. 
 Bugeaud had operated under similar principles in Algeria when utilising a combination of 
intelligence and mobility to strike deep into areas that would keep his enemy off-balance.78 In spite of 
the humiliating reverses at Isandlwhana (1879) and Majuba Hill (1881), Callwell could also see the 
benefits, under certain circumstances, to trust in the separation of forces to secure an operational 
advantage against a disorganised enemy. He wrote, 
If each part of a divided army is in itself a match for whatever force the enemy may bring 
against it, defeat in detail is not to be feared. When dispersion is not prejudicial to security it 
has much to recommend it. The mobility of an army is in inverse proportion to its size. 
Movement in several columns therefore facilitates operations. The same forces moreover 
are at work in preventing the massing of the hostile legions against one fraction of the divided 
host as tend to safeguard its communications against organized attack. […] A strong 
argument in favour of invasion on several lines is […] in the moral effect produced on the 
enemy by the occupation of wide stretches of territory, and in the influence that the 
appearance of hostile bodies on all sides must exert on a people who know not how to turn 
the situation to account.79 
The CFS’ advances on Nyangwé, Kasongo, Riba-Riba, and Stanley Falls in short order clearly paid 
homage to this principle. 
In other ways, Dhanis’ prioritisation of psychological and moral factors in tactical 
considerations also spoke to a patchwork of nineteenth century counter-insurgency ideals. Fortitude, 
enthusiasm, and perseverance were more important than line, square, or shock.80 Élan was often 
prized above all else. Lémery’s recollections detail the importance of the white officer to lead the 
attack, from which point, ‘Nothing can stop the force of the élan; either everyone dies or ends up 
victorious. It is the savage and spontaneous attack, which throughout this campaign, has been our 
strength, as we were always lacking in numbers’.81 Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that Dhanis 
and other Force Publique officers deliberately withheld fire in engagements where the possibility of 
hand-to-hand combat presented itself. While this may well have been part of a broader attempt to 
conserve precious ammunition – particularly when faced with small-scale skirmishes fought in open 
order - it soon became evident that the bayonet had an important psychological role to play in the 
Congo-Arab War. Arab warriors, it was felt, feared cold steel and fled at the sight of it, leaving many 
suspicious officers as whole-hearted converts to its place on the African battlefield.82 This was 
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reflected in Donny’s tactical summary of operations too, though he noted that it ought to be 
exclusively used in bush areas, at night, and when forming square.83 
 This is not to say that firepower was not equally prized. As previously stated, the benefits of a 
well-drilled force laying down a significant weight of shot could also compensate for the deficit in 
numbers. After all, as Callwell noted, ‘Confronted with the rifle and the field piece, assegai and jezail 
are robbed of their terrors. Individual daring and fanaticism are no match for discipline and mutual 
reliance.’84 This spoke to Bugeaud’s theories on firepower in pitched battles as much as it did to 
Donny’s, whose views echoed those of his predecessors and contemporaries in striking fashion. 
Operating on the offensive but assuming the tactical defensive would allow for the weight of fire to 
increase the chances of success. It was his opinion that,  
colonial campaigns will be shortened, therefore also rendered more economical, if the troops 
are comprised of a strong nucleus of veritable soldiers, calm, proven marksmen, well 
supervised, trained to be stoic rather than to flee, armed with sophisticated weapons and 
carrying a large quantity of ammunition.85 
However, colonial warfare rarely offered up many opportunities for decisive fire-action. When they 
did, as in the case of Omdurman in 1898, the superiority of weaponry and training proved itself to 
devastating effect.86 In more open skirmishes, where factors such as terrain, surprise, or manoeuvre 
might alter the effect of the rifle, it was often deemed prudent to withhold fire and pursue alternative 
methods to break the will of the enemy. In this sense, mobility and élan proved to be as important. 
 By mid-1893, and the second phase of the campaign, the Force Publique began to encounter 
different tactical challenges. Positional warfare is not something that ordinarily resonates with 
theories of counter-insurgency or small wars, but in the case of the Congo-Arab war came to define 
the conduct of operations. Rumaliza, alongside the remnants of other beaten Arab forces, remained 
the solitary threat to the CFS. When intelligence was received that he was marching on Kasongo with 
10,000 men, Dhanis moved immediately to meet him. Crossing the Luama River (a tributary of the 
Lualaba) the opposing forces met for the first time on 15 October 1893. However, this was no ordinary 
encounter. Rather than facing the prospect of an ambush, skirmishing, or a traditional open-order 
firefight across bush, village, or woodland, the Force Publique found Rumaliza’s forces well-ensconced 
in defensive bomas (defensive works constructed from hardened clay), from which they proved 
difficult to dislodge. Dhanis’ forces had previously laid siege to towns such as Nyangwe and Kasongo, 




 ‘The art of field fortification as understood by antagonists such as we have to deal with in Asia 
and Africa, and as applied against them,’ Callwell wrote, ‘is interesting, for it illustrates the advantages 
derived from the most simple defence works in such wars.’87 This proved to be the case as Dhanis’ 
force of 400 men failed to break through following an audacious flanking attack. The bomas were so 
well fortified that, even at a distance of 100 yards, the light artillery on hand struggled to make much 
of an impression.88 Lacking in men and materiel, Dhanis was forced to await reinforcements as he tried 
to starve out his opponents. In the meantime, his forces were subjected to constant harassment by 
the enemy, whose sorties in October caused many casualties, including the death of Lieutenant Pierre 
Ponthier. By mid-November, the combination of battle casualties and food supplies began to bite. As 
both sides took stock of events, Rumaliza evaded surveillance and retreated during the night of 15/16 
November. Captain de Wouters was placed in charge of the pursuing light column, while Dhanis 
returned to Kasongo to prepare a better equipped expeditionary force.89 Contact was made at Ogella 
on 19 November. The ensuing firefight proved to be a reversal for the Force Publique during which 
Lieutenant de Heusch was also killed. Were it not for the death of Sefu among the multitude of Arab 
casualties, Dhanis might well have considered the whole sorry episode a complete failure.90  
As it was, Dhanis led his new expedition of 15 Europeans, 700 regulars, and approximately 
2,000 auxiliaries, back towards Rumaliza’s newly established defensive bomas covering Kabambare.91 
Still short of adequate supplies to force the issue, Dhanis was obliged to lay siege and await further 
reinforcements from Captain Hubert Joseph Lothaire, who would later be infamously embroiled in the 
Charlie Stokes Affair in 1895.92 The junction was made in mid-December 1893, adding a further 300 
men to Dhanis’ strength.93 Importantly, Dhanis also brought with him heavier artillery pieces, which 
had been used to great effect by Chaltin against similar opposition during his campaign to relieve 
Stanley Falls.94 
Since Bugeaud’s arrival in Algeria, the quest for mobility in combatting irregular forces 
condemned the role of artillery to that of a secondary importance. Mobile columns relied on speed 
and logistical self-sustainment. Artillery was considered cumbersome and burdensome to colonial 
operations.95 Light field and mountain pieces had found specific roles, but its general experience had 
shown ‘an average expenditure of shell far below what is usual in Continental campaigns.’96 For the 
Force Publique, however, the moral and operational advantages of deploying artillery was somewhat 
out of step with contemporaneous trends of thought. Twelve 75mm Krupp mountain pieces were 
shipped to the Congo in 1890 to be formed into a fully-fledge battery under the command of Michaux. 
An unknown number of lighter, 37mm Hotchkiss and a further 23, 47mm Nordenfeld guns, built by 
Cockerill of Seraing, were added to the CFS’ arsenal in 1892.97 The latter were specifically designed for 
Africa with removable parts allowing for ease of transportation. Apart from the gun itself, which 
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required two men to carry it, its other components and its ammunition, never exceed 35 kilograms in 
weight and could be carried by a single porter. Capable of being assembled in five minutes, these guns 
were seen as ideal for the Congo. Artillery, in general, was viewed by Donny as having a tremendous 
moral effect on the enemy and was, as such, indispensable to overcoming specific obstacles during 
the campaign.98 
On the banks of the Lulundi River, Dhanis encountered Rumaliza’s bomas echeloned across 
the road to Kabambare. On 14 January 1894, an assault on the bomas dislodged the Arabs from their 
defensive works. The artillery was at the heart of the victory. Having isolated the bomas from one 
another ahead of a general assault on Rumaliza’s grand boma, an errant shell from a 75mm Krupp gun 
landed inside the central structure. Setting it ablaze, the Arab forces panicked and fled. Rumaliza 
escaped with a handful of his followers. The other bomas capitulated and their occupants were taken 
prisoner. Rumaliza fled first to Kabambare before being pursued into German East Africa by Lothaire 
at the head of a 400-strong column. All that remained was to make contact at Lake Tanganyika with 
the Anti-Slavery Society forces led by Captain Alphonse Jacques (later raised to Baron Jacques of 
Diksmuide for his services in the Great War), who had been engaged in operations against one of 
Rumaliza’s lieutenants in the region.99 This done, by March 1894 the CFS could claim its territory 
largely free of Arab influence.  
At the cost of just 16 Belgian officers and non-commissioned officers (six through sickness), 
the destruction of the ill-co-ordinated Swahili Empire was the making of those that survived.100 
Promotions followed, and in the case of Dhanis, the title of Baron was bestowed, demonstrating the 
degree to which imperial service, as in Britain and France, could confer status on those whose careers 
might otherwise have lacked notoriety. For a nation that struggled to fully buy into the imperial 
project, the enthusiasm with which funds were raised by public subscription for a memorial to him in 
Antwerp in 1913 reveals the extent of Dhanis’ domestic fame.101  Nevertheless, Dhanis’ name does 
not sit within the pantheon of counter-insurgency practitioners or theorists for one simple reason. His 
methods did not diverge significantly from the basic principles of those whose actions served to carve 
out larger empires for France and Britain. Yet, this is precisely the reason for which his actions, and 
the Congo-Arab War more generally, ought to be examined. A series of commonalities underpin the 
experience of most nineteenth century counter-insurgency that cannot be ignored. The subordination 
of political to military objectives, the assimilation of local culture and practices into pacification 
methods, the seizure of the operational initiative to counter the strategic deficit, and the importance 
of a well-drilled cadre to execute flexible tactics in order to bring the weight of technological 
superiority to bear, are all recognisable facets that transcend national traditions. Whether consciously 
adopted or developed independently, these basic principles provided many a colonial officer with 
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answers to the vagaries and unpredictabilities that small wars produced. No two campaigns were ever 
the same and precise rules are anathema to a successful counter-insurgency. However, action taken 
with the bounds of basic, adaptable principles allowed for the likes of Dhanis to cobble together a 
hybrid system that led his meagre forces to victory in the Congo-Arab war against a numerous, well-
equipped, and highly capable opponent. 
 
1 Colonel Donny, L’art militaire au Congo. Brussels: G Muquardt, 1897. 
2 Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. London: HMSO, 1896. Reprinted by Oregon: 
Watchmaker Publishing, 2010; Hubert Lyautey, ‘Du rôle colonial de l’armée’, Revue des deux mondes (15 
January, 1900). To understand the frequency of colonial campaigning in the late nineteenth century, see Ian 
F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750. London 
& New York: Routledge, 2001, 31-32. 
3 Thomas Rid, ‘The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 
vol. 33, no. 5 (2010), 727-758; David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011; and Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
4 Douglas Porch, ‘Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare’, in Peter Paret (ed.), 
The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 377. 
5 Porch, Counterinsurgency, 50. 
6 Porch, ‘Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey’, 377. 
7 Philippe Marechal, De ‘Arabische’ Campagne in het Maniema-Gebied (1892-1894) Situering Binnen het 
Kolonisatieproces in de Onafhankelijke Kongostaat. Tervuren: Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale, 1992, 239-241. 
8 Ibid., 241; and L.H. Gann & Peter Duigan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa 1884-1914. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979, 53. 
9 Captain Charles E. Callwell R.A., ‘Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British Forces have been 
Employed Since the Year 1865’, RUSI, vol. 31, issue. 139, (1887), 357-412. 
10 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, 24-25 & 35. 
11 Ibid., 27-29, & 40; and Porch, Counterinsurgency, 52-54 
12 Ibid., Beckett, 42. 
13 For more on Belgian colonial campaigning, see Jacques Robert Leconte, Les Tentatives d’Expansion Coloniale 
sous le Regne de Léopold 1er. Antwerp: V. Van Dieren & Co, 1946. For Mexico, a detailed account of Belgian 
involvement in Mexico, see Albert Duchesne, L’Expédition des volontaires belges au Mexique 1864-1867: au 
service de Maximilien et de Charlotte. Vols. 1 & 2. Brussels: Musée Royale de l’Armée et d’Histoire Militiaire, 
1967-68. 
14 Porch, The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History. London: Macmillan, 1991, 145-148. 
15 Gann & Duigan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 55-56. 
16 Richard J. Reid, Warfare in African History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 103-104. 
17 Ibid., 107-145. 
18 Giacomo Macola, The Gun in Central Africa: A History of Technology and Politics. Athens, OH: Ohio University 
Press, 2016, 84. 
19 Guy Vanthemsche, Belgium and the Congo 1885-1980. Translated by Alice Cameron & Stephen Windross; 
revised by Kate Connelly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 19-22. 
20 Royal Archives, Brussels [RA], Cabinet Léopold II [CLII], Expansion, 144/39, Report to the King on the political 
and military measures taken to bring about the repression of the slave trade in the territories of the State. 
Undated [Likely, 1889]. 
21 War Heritage Institute, Brussels [WHI], Archives of Belgian Military Abroad [BMA], 43/51 XV/16, Théophile 
Wahis to Camille Janssen, 31 August 1890. 
22 Macola, The Gun in Central Africa, 107. 
23 Vanthemsche, Belgium and the Congo, 22-23. 
                                                          
16 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
24 RA, CLII, Expansion, 144/39, Report to the King. Undated [Likely, 1889]; WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/263/18, Henri 
Doquier to Merette & Constant Desmet, 3 August 1892; & Macola, The Gun in Central Africa, 93. 
25 Marechal, De ‘Arabische’ Campagne, 240; WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/314, Émile Lémery Papers, clipping from Le 
Soir, 5 August 1955. This was part of a series of articles printed between 4-6 August 1955 based on rediscovered 
correspondence by Lémery’s nephew. And Le Baron Dhanis au Kwango et pendant la campagne arabe. Antwerp: 
J.-B. Van Caneghem, 1910, 21. 
26 Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912. London: Abacus, 1992, 438. 
27 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, 34. For a general appreciation of British recruitment 
policy in India, see David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj. The Indian Army 1860-1940. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1994; Kaushik Roy, War and Society in Colonial India, 1807-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006; and The Army in British India: From Colonial Warfare to Total War, 1857-1947. London: Bloomsbury, 2012; 
and Rob Johnson, ‘General Roberts, the Occupation of Kabul, and the Problems of Transition, 1879-1880’, War 
in History, vol. 20, no. 3 (2013), 304, & 311-312. 
28 Porch, ‘Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey’, 380-381. 
29 Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914. London: University College London Press, 
1998, 68. 
30 Rid, ‘Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, 739-740; and Anthony Thrall Sullivan, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud: 
France and Algeria, 1784-1849: Politics, Power, and the Good Society. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1983, 99-100. 
31 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, 41. 
32 Porch, ‘Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey’, 388; and Counterinsurgency, 51-54. 
33 Callwell, Lessons to be Learnt, 363. 
34 RA, CLII, Expansion, 144/39, Report to the King. Undated [Likely, 1889]. 
35 WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/17, Edmond van Eetvelde to Camille Janssen, 15 September 1890. 
36 WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/13, Théophile Wahis to Camille Janssen, 30 July 1890. 
37 For an overview of European-Arab relations and its deterioration see, R.P. P. Cuelemans, La question arabe et 
le Congo (1883-1892). Brussels: Académie royale des Sciences colonials: Classe des Sciences Morales et 
Politiques, 1959, 64-85, 98-121, 147-235 & 269-367; and Ruth Slade, King Leopold’s Congo: Aspects of the 
Development of Race Relations in the Congo Independent State. London: Oxford University Press, 1962, 89-102 
& 106-110.  
38 WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/16, Théophile Wahis to Camille Jannsen, 31 August 1890. 






44 La Belgique Militaire, No. 1052, 31 May 1891, 657-658; and Lord Wah, ‘Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis – La 
Guerre Arabe’, extract from Revue de l’Armée Belge (Tomes II & III, 1894-95). Liège: Direction & Administration, 
1894, 29. For a comprehensive overview see, R. P. L. Lotar, La Grande Chronique de l’Uele suivant la collection 
du Mouvement Géographique, de la Belgique Coloniale, etc. ainsi que des documents inédits en possession de 
l’auteur ou lui communiqués. Brussels: Académie royale des Sciences colonials: Classe des Sciences Morales et 
Politiques, 1946. 
45 Demetrius Charles Boulger, The Congo State: Or, the Growth of Civilisation in Central Africa. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, 161-162; and WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/36, Lieutenant Sibieux to Nicolas Isidore 
Tobback, 14 March 1892. 
46 Packenham, The Scramble for Africa, 436-437. 
47 Marechal, De ‘Arabische’ Campagne, 233-234. 
48 Deuxième Section de l’État-Major de la Force Publique, La Force Publique de sa Naissance à 1914: Participation 
des militaires à l’histoire des premières années du Congo. Gebloux: J. Duculot, 1952), 36-39. 
49 Gann & Duigan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 79. 
50 Marechal, De ‘Arabische’ Campagne, 233-234; L.F. Vanderstraeten, ‘Léopold II et la Force Publique’, in Patrick 
Lefèvre (et.al.) (ed.), Léopold II et la Force Publique du Congo. Brussels: Cercle royal des anciens officiers des 
campagnes d’Afrique, 1985, 12; and Guy De Boeck, BAONI: Les revoltes de la Force Publique sous Léopold II 1895-
1908. Antwerp: Les Editions EPO, 1987, 34-35. 
51 WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/35, Nicolas Isidore Tobback to Camille Jannsen, 27 February 1892. 
52 WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/314, Émile Lémery Papers, clipping from Le Soir, 5 August 1955. 
53 Vanderstraeten, ‘Léopold II et la Force Publique’, 15. 
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
54 Marechal, De ‘Arabische’ Campagne, 233-234. 
55 In Belgian sources and historiography this is often spelled as Gongo Lutété, however more recent Sankuru-
based historians prefer to use Luteta in a bid to establish him as an authentic ‘Tetela’. See, David M. Gordon, 
‘Interpreting Documentary Sources on the Early History of the Congo Free State: The Case of Ngongo Luteta’s 
Rise and Fall’, History in Africa, vol. 41, (2014), 17-18. 
56 Le Soir, 21 August 1892; and Le Baron Dhanis au Kwango, 18-19. 
57 Gordon, ‘Interpreting Documentary Sources’, 19-22. 
58 RA, CLII, Expansion, 144/39, Report to the King. Undated [Likely, 1889]; and Marechal, De ‘Arabische’ 
Campagne, 233. 
59 Marechal, De ‘Arabische’ Campagne, 234. 
60 Callwell, Lessons to be Learnt, 362; and Dierk Walter, Colonial Violence: European Empires and the Use of 
Force. [Translated by Peter Lewis]. London: Hurst & Company, 2017, 98-101, 210-212 & 245-247. 
61 Porch, Counterinsurgency, 20; and The French Foreign Legion, 147-149; and Edward Spiers, The Late Victorian 
Army, 1868-1902, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992, 295 & 317-318. 
62 Walter, Colonial Violence, 82. 
63 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2005, 134-135 
64 Donny, L’art militaire au Congo, 17. 
65 Callwell, Lessons to be Learnt, 364. 
66 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, 33. 
67 Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest, 68. 
68 Musée Royal d’Afrique Centrale [MRAC], Francis Dhanis Papers, HA.01.0003/40, Letter of Promotion to Second 
Lieutenant, 12 May 1884 
69 Mario Draper, The Belgian Army and Society from Independence to the Great War. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018, 51, & 74-76. 
70 Gann & Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 61-64. 
71 Marechal, De ‘Arabische’ Campagne, 240-241. An interesting example of this was Lieutenant Henri Doquier, 
who hoped that his service in the Congo-Arab War and his decision to risk the perils of another expedition in 
1896, would ensure his promotion to Captain, which was ‘in his sights’. See WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/263/26, Henri 
Doquier to Merette & Constant Desmet, 27 November 1893; 43/55 XV 263/1-33, Henri Doquier to Merette & 
Constant Desmet, 9 June 1896; & 43/55 XV 263/33, Henri Doquier to Constant Desmet, 2 November 1896. 
72 Porch, ‘Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey’, 380-382, 385-386, & 401. 
73 MRAC, Francis Dhanis Papers, HA.01.0003/140, Francis Dhanis to Alexandre Delcommune, 28 December 1892. 
74 Sidney Langford Hinde, The Fall of the Congo Arabs. London: Methuen & Co, 1897, 215; & Vanderstraeten, 
‘Léopold II et la Force Publique’, 21. 
75 Callwell, Lessons to be Learnt, 367. 
76 MRAC, Francis Dhanis Papers, HA.01.0003/140, Francis Dhanis to Alexandre Delcommune, 28 December 1892; 
Wah, ‘Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis’, 32; and Le Baron Dhanis au Kwango, 19. 
77 Wah, ‘Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis’, 33; and Le Baron Dhanis au Kwango, 20. 
78 Porch, ‘Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey’, 378-379. 
79 Callwell, Lessons to be Learnt, 367. 
80 Marechal, De ‘Arabische’ Campagne, 240. 
81 WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/314, Émile Lémery Papers, clipping from Le Soir, 5 August 1955. 
82 WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/192, Edgard Cerckel Papers. Clipping from Le Soir, October 1952 entitled ‘Un survivant 
de la campagne anitesclavagiste du Congo; and 43/55 XV/188 Florent Cassart Papers. Extract from Le Franc 
Tirreur, 7 December 1913. 
83 Donny, L’art militaire au Congo, 41-42. 
84 Callwell, Lessons to be Learnt, 370. 
85 Donny, L’art militaire au Congo, 141-142. 
86 Ian F.W. Beckett, The Victorians at War. London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006, 182. 
87 Callwell, Lessons to be Learnt, 397. 
88 Baron Dhanis, 25; Wah, ‘Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis’, 35. 
89 Baron Dhanis, 27. 
90 Hinde, The Fall of the Congo Arabs, 231. 
91 Baron Dhanis, 28. 
92 For more on this see, W.R. Louis, ‘The Stokes Affair and the Origins of the Anti-Congo Campaign, 1895-1896’, 
Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire, vol. 43, no. 2, (1965), 572-584; Daniel Laqua, The Age of Internationalism 
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Belgium, 1880-1930: Peace, Progress and Prestige. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013, 56-57; 
Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, 586. 
93 WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV 284/1, Extract from La Belgique Militaire, 24 October 1897. 
94 MRAC, Francis Dhanis Papers, HA.01.0003/138, Louis-Napoléon Chaltin to Francis Dhanis, 17 November 1893; 
WHI, BMA, 43/56 XV 426, Notes of Servive by Auguste Théophile Léon Rom [Undated]; and Wah, ‘Le Congo: le 
retour de Dhanis’, 37. 
95 Porch, Counterinsurgency, 16 & 20; and, ‘Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey’, 378. 
96 Callwell, Lessons to be Learnt, 407. 
97 Vanderstraeten, ‘Léopold II et la Force Publique’, 15. 
98 Donny, L’art militaire au Congo, 42-45. 
99 Vanderstraeten, ‘Léopold II et la Force Publique’, 23; & Wah, ‘Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis’, 36. 
100 Gann & Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 57.  
101 Matthew G. Stanard, ‘Learning to love Leopold: Belgian popular imperialism, 1830-1960’, in John M. 
Mackenzie (ed.), European empires and the people: Popular responses to imperialism in France, Britain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Italy. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011, 135. 
